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CHAPTl!R ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
Throughout the nation, the commuter problem 
has become one of the most acute problems faced by city 
and state governments. Boston, New York, Cinncinnati, 
Chicago and other large cities have been faced with a 
decrease in the use of mass transportation facilities 
and a corresponding increase in the use of private auto. 
mobiles for commuting. Metropolitan transit lines and 
railroad commuter lines have been forced to operate with 
large deficits in order to maintain service. The public-
ly owned transit lines are subsidized directly by the 
communities served, but the railroads haYe a more serious 
problem. Privately owned, but forced by state regulatory 
-
commissions to continue uneconomical commuter service, 
they have been caught in the squeeze between higher 
coats and lower revenues, with little or no help from 
the communities served. 
Metropolitan Boston has been trying to solve 
5 
this problem since 1935. The Coolidge Report*, issued in 1947#, 
* 47 ... 
# An earlier report was issued in 1945 by the same 
Commission. 
constituted a comprehensive study of the needs of the 
community, and it developed an integrated plan to attempt 
to solve it. 
More recently, direct action was taken by the 
General Court of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts to pre-
vent the cessation of the railroad commuting facilities of 
the Old Colony branch of the New Haven Railroad. While 
the bill passed did not attempt to provide a permanent 
solution to the problem, its enactment points to the real-
ization by the community that the Greater Boston Al~ea 
needs the railroads as an intregal part of its transporta-
tion system. 
This study is devoted to the railroad commuter 
problem in the Greater Boston Area.# A detailed examina-
tion of the roles assigned to the railroads in the various 
proposals that have been offered to solve the problem 
will be made. But greater emphasis will be placed on the 
role of New England Railroads in the New England economy. 
Basically, the question is: Do the railroads in this area 
need the support of the community and does the community 
need the railroads? 
# The Greater Boston Area refers to the 65 cities and 
toWD£ included in the Census Bureau's 1950 definition 
of the Boston Standard Metropolitan~Area. This de-
finition is also used by the Greater Boston Economic 
Study Committee. 
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CHAPTER T\i"O 
THE IMPORTANCE OF PASSENGER REVENUE 
TO NEll1 ENGLAND RAILROADS 
Because of the geographical location of New 
England, railroads in this region depend on passenger 
revenues for a larger proportion of their gross revenues 
than do railroads in other sections of the nation. The 
Boston and Maine Railroad and the New Haven Railroad are 
both large carriers of passengers. In 1955, only the 
New York Central and the Pennsylvania Railroads exceeded 
the New Haven in terms of passenger revenue, and the New 
Raven's ratio of passenger revenue to total revenue was 
higher than any railroad of large size in the country, 
with the exception of the Long Island. The New England 
railroads, as a group, obtained almost 19.4% of their 
gross operating revenues from passengers in 1955, com-
pared with a national average of Class I railroads# of 
7.4% and an eastern average, excluding New England, of 
Passenger revenue is very important to the 
New England railroads. Of the 44,797,373 passengers 
# Class I Railroads are companies that operate trains 
between terminals and stations and have annual reve-
nues over $1,000,000. 
ito 3, P.l9 
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carried on the New Haven in 1955, 29,422,177 w·ere 
commuters.~~ The total passenger revenue for 1955 was 
$47,773,559 of which $11,420,474 came from commuters.# 
therefore, while passenger traffic( is so important to 
the railroads in this section of the country, commuter 
traffic is an important part of that total. 
"'VTb.ile this report is not primarily concerned 
with fares, it should be pointed out that the railroads 
face a peculiar serie£3. of problems when fixing rates for 
commuter fares. They must .. consider that there is a limit 
on how much a passenger will pay before turning to his 
own car, or to a car pool, for transportation. For the 
same reason, rates must be decreased, per mile, as the 
distance travelled increases. At the same time, the cost 
of providing commuter service iB high, because of the 
high cost of labor and the idleness of the equipment be-
tween the rush hours. Reference is often made, by ed-
itorial writers and students of the .railroad problem, to 
the tv1enty hour week in commuting service. Train crews, 
who work only about four hours a day, often receive over-
time pay because of the time spread between .runs, and the 
equipment is only used during the brief rush hours. 
Because of it's importance to the Boston area, 
-It- 3, P. 47 
# In 1955, commuter service accounted for almost 66% of 
the passengers on the Nevr Haven and that service pro-
duced approximately 24% of all passenger .revenue. 
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the New Haven Railroad will receive the greatest attention 
in this report. A brief examination of the revenue 
structure of that road will emphasize the importance of 
passenger revenue. The railway operating revenue of the 
New Haven Railroad for the years l953-l958 is reproduced 
in TABLE I .. 
TABLE I 
RAILWAY OJ?ERATING REVENUES 
NEW HAVEN RAILROAD l953-l958 
(Millions of $) 
O~erating Revenue l958 1.2.2.7. l956 l955 
Freight 78.7 9l.5 9l.7 89.4 
Passegger 56.6 53.7 5l.5 47.8 
All Other # 19.8 l8.9 l9.2. 18.0 
l954 1:222. 
82.5 94.9 
49.9 51.4 
l7.6 18.7 
Total 149.l l64.l l62.4.l55.2 150.0 165.0 
Source: Moody • s Transportation Manual, 1958 
From 1953-l958, passenger revenues accounted for 
about one-half of the combined freight and passenger rev-
enues of the railroad, and for about one-third of the 
total operating revenues. 
During the same period of time, profits on the 
New Haven have been declining. The annual profit or loss 
for the years 1953-l958 are shown in Table II. Table II 
# Rental incomes constitute the largest portion of other 
income. 
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shows that the New Raven's profits declined steadily from 
1953 to 1956 and that the railroad suffered losses in 
1957 and 1958. 
1958 
1957 
1956 
1955 
1954 
1953 
TABLE II 
NEW HAVEN RAIIROAD 
NET PROFIT OR LOSS 
1953-1958* 
LOSS 
LOSS 
Profit 
Profit 
Profit 
Profit 
$4,276, 639# 
2,363,702 
261,704 
4,246,534 
9,090,635 
6,060,348 
# Includes $450,000 paid on subsidy 
from the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. 
* 7, (1959 supplement) 
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CHAPT:ER THREE 
THE OLD COLONY PROBLEM 
The present dilemma o~ the Old Colony branch 
of the New Haven Railroad presents a good example of the 
problems faced by commuter railroads and the communities 
that they serve. 
HISTORY OF THE OLD COLONY 
The Old Colony is reputedly the oldest incor-
porated railroad in the United States. It was built to 
haul granite from the Quincy quarries to Charlestown, 
Massachusetts, to be used in the construction of the 
Bunker Hill Monument. 
In 1893, the New York, New Haven and Hartford 
Railroad gompany (the New Haven) tobk a 99 year lease on 
the Old Colony and its properties.# At that time, the 
Old Colony was a profitable line, and the prospects for 
ll 
the future were good. The New Haven agreed to pay a rental 
of $2,500,000 yearly for the lease, but in 1935, the New 
Haven was forced to file a petition for bankruptcy and 
reorganization (because of excessive debt burdens piled up 
in the twenties) and the trustees disaffirmed the lease. 
# The lease provided for a 7% return on Old Colony stock. 
The New Haven assummed all operations on the lines. 
REORGANIZATION OF THE NEW HAVEN 
The reorganization proceedings of the New Haven 
were both long~ and complicated. The Old Colony asked to 
be considered in the proceedings and this request was 
granted by the United States District Court in New Haven, 
Conn., where the reorganization. hearings took place. 
12 
First, the Old Colony decided to sue the Trustees 
of the New Haven for damages because of their action in 
breaking the lease. The District Court awarded the Old 
Colony damages of $40,000,000. At that time, as well as 
now, the Old Colony was not capable of operating independ-
ently because of a lack of rolling stock. Because they 
were compelled to operate the Old Colony during the reorgani-
zation proceedings, the New Haven kept a careful record of 
losses in those operations from 1936 to 1939, and the same 
court that had awarded the forty million dollars to the 
Old Colony now ordered the Old Colony to pay the New Haven 
$11,367,000 for the losses. 
The New Haven has been dependent on the Boston 
and Providence Line (the nshore Lineu) for oontinued op-
eration. Because the Old Colony owns that line, the New 
Haven has never been able to divorce itself from that line. 
The reorganization proceedings produced many 
bitter foes. These were held in the United States District 
Court in New Haven, Conn. It was 1939 and the New Haven, 
even then, wished to discontinue passenger service on the 
Old Colony. The New York Central Railroad opposed the 
plan to abandon the Old Colony because it would increase 
the share that the Central would have to bear of the bur-
den of maintaining South Station in Boston. Representa-
tives of the Railroad Brotherhood opposed the plan be-
cause of the curtailment of employment that would be 
caused by the cessation of service. 
ICC PLAN FOR REORGANIZATION 
On October 14, 1942, the Interstate Commerce 
Commission issued the final plan of reorganization for 
the New Haven. 
13 
The plan provided that the United States District 
Court in New Haven should have the final deci.sion on the 
plan and the power to cure any defect in it. 
The portions of the plan affecting the Old 
Colony were as follows.: 
The New Haven was to acquire properties, assets 
and franchises of the Old Colony in consideration for 
$3,289,600 of fixed interest bonds and $2,467,200 of 
income bonds. Arrangements would be made- to relieve the 
New Haven and the Old Colony of their obligation to 
continue the use of South Station. 
Both the New Haven Railroad and the Old Colony 
would be relieved of their obligation to continue passenger 
14 
service on the lines of the Old Colony, but, the New Haven 
would agree to operate such service so long as losses from 
it did not exceed certain "critical figures".# 
The plan provided that the New Haven would keep 
monthly figures on the amount of passenger losses on the 
Old Colony.. This would provide a basis for determining 
if' the "critical figure" has been reached. It was stipu-
lated that the figures would be based on the application 
of a segregation formula and that the apportionment of 
the Old Colony's revenue and freight service should be made 
under the Commissions prescribed rules for separating 
common revenues and expenses between passenger and freight 
service. 
The final reorganization plan was approved by 
the United States District Court in New Haven on September 
18, 1947, with an effective date of July 1, 1947. Under 
the final plan, all business affairs and properties of the 
Old Colony were vested in the New Haven. The provisions of' 
the reorganization that applied to the Old Colony are 
discussed above. In addition, the Commonwealth of Mass-
achusetts was given an option to buy certain property of' 
the Old Colony Line.## 
# 
## 
These figures were $850,000 for any consecutive twelve 
month period in the first two years of the plans 
operation and $500,000 in any consecutive 24 month 
period after that. 
The Boston Grbup Lines from Boston to Braintree. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
THE COOLIDGE REPORT 
During the period of reorganization, the Old 
Colony attempted to abandon some fifty stations on the 
line. The Attorney General o:r Massachusetts stated 1n 
1939 that the plan to abandon any station was a "de-
liberate attempt of the tendency to overlook the in= 
controvertible fact that they (the railroad) owe a ser-
vice to the public. 11 * 
So the hassle continued, with the railroad 
trying to curtail service and the Commonwealth attempt-
ing to force them to maintain service. During the war, 
Massachusetts public officials declared that it was es-
sential to the defense of the United States that the 
service be continued. Meanwhile, losses on the Old 
Colony piled up, and the road repeatedly threatened to 
discontinue the commuter service. 
THE COOLIDGE COMMISSION 
Nothing was done by the Commonwealth to solve 
the problem until 1947, when the final report of the 
Metropolitan Transit Recess Commission was published.** 
* 17, July 24, 1939 
** 47 
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This Commission had been established, under the chairman- . 
ship of Arthur W. Coolidge, by the General Court to in-
vestigate the problems o:t' transportation in the Greater 
Boston Area. At that time, the transit system in Boston 
was the privately owned Boston Elevated Railway Company. 
The Company had been operatLng with a de:t'icit for many 
ye&rs and the Commonwealth was obligated to guarantee 
payment o:t' interest on its bonds~' 
TEE COOLIDGE COMMISSION'S FINDINGS 
The Commission rea1ized that the people who 
worked in Boston were moving to the suburbs in increasing 
numbers. Many of them could not use the facilities of 
the Elevated because it did not serve their areas. The 
increasing use of the automobile was also causing an 
intolerable congestion problem in the downtown area. 
The Commission took a close look at the areas served by 
the railroads and concluded that the equipment used by 
the railroads was too costly and too cumbersome to be used 
in short haul commuter service. lt was felt that the 
railroads concerned could not establish the integrated 
service which the members o:t' the Commission hoped to 
see established. 
The Commission was interested in all phases 
o:t' the transportation problem, including the railroad 
16 
commuter problem. In their report,, the Commission 
stated that: 
The problem o~ the discontinuance 
o~ passenger service on the Old Colony 
System or the New York, New Haven and 
Hartford Railroad, by force or judicial 
decree, is no less likely now ••• It has 
become apparent that the reorganized 
New Haven will not become encumbered 
by the inevitable losses resulting ~rom 
the commuter-passenger.service. The 
railroads should be restored to their 
trunk line long haul passenger and 
essential rreight service ••• the solu= 
tion •.•• is rapid transit.* 
RECOMMENDATION.OF COOLIDGE COMMISSION 
As a result or their investigation into the 
over-all problem, the Commission recommended the estab-
lisbment o~ a Metropolitan Transit Authority, which 
would purchase the existing Boston Elevated Railway 
Company. Recommendations were also made to extend the 
service that would be o~fered by the Metropolitan Transit 
Authority to Braintree. Other recommendations were made 
which would increase service and racilities in the down-
town area and to Metropolitan areas by utilizing New 
Haven tracks to Dedham and Boston and Albany tracks to 
Riverside. 
The Metropolitan Transit Authority was created.~ 
-if 47, Chapter VIII 
17 
The Boston Elevated Railway Company was purchased by the 
Commonwealth. Bu.t nothing was done about tb.e railroad 
commuting problem. 
18 
CHAPTER FIVE 
THE FIRST SUBSIDY PROPOSAL 
Time passed. The New Haven continued service 
on the Old Colony but was continuously seeking relie~ 
~rom the losses incurred. The public of~icials of 
Massachusetts did little or nothing to solve the problem. 
PROPOSAL OF A SUBSIDY 
George Alpert, President o~ the New Haven, 
suggested a subsidy ~rom the public to maintain commuter 
passenger service.* This represented a bold, new 
approach to the commuter problem. 
According to a count made by the Greater Boston 
Chamber o~ Commerce, approximately 900,000 people travel 
to Boston each day by private automobile from the Great-
er Boston Metropolitan Area. These people are carried in 
575,000 vehicles. The city has been ~aced with the 
staggering problem of (1) how to keep those cars moving, 
and (2) how to provide space to park them. New highways, 
the widening o~ streets, and public garages have been the 
solutions worked out by the city. But a study made by 
l9 
the Chamber of Commerce revealed that when a new, convenient 
it> 22 
garage was recently opened in the city, two additional 
cars came into the area ror every tbree that parked in 
the garage. Within a period or three weeks, the streets 
were more congested than ever.* 
Why, then, do people drive their cars into 
the city? The big answer seems to be convenience. 
Buses, particularly downtown, do not offer adequate ser-
vice. And, according to Mr. Alpert, commuter service 
on the railroads is not complete enough. Trains are 
too few and far between, he says. This fact alone 
accounts for many of the cars. But, is it possib~e to 
induce people to ride the trains 'l According to Mr. 
Alpert, the evidence indicates that it is possible. He 
points out that, as improvements in service have been 
made on the New Haven, the number of commuters carried 
has increased constantly. (This contention of Mr. 
Alpert's seems quite valid in the light of a recent 
experiment in Fhiladelphia, OPERATION NORTHWEST, which 
will be examined later). 
We are still faced with the problem or more 
and more cars entering the city daily. Naturally, if 
people will ride the trains, a good deal of this traffic 
will be eliminated. But can the railroads, without 
* 22, P. 30 
20 
public aid, offer the type of service that is needed? The 
figures offered by the Old Colony indicate that they 
cannot. 
The reasons are many and varied. Basically, 
they are caused by (l) some commuter lines being on 
branch lines that carry no other kind of traffic, there-
fore, the commuter service must carry the whole weight of 
the qosts, (2) the seasonal nature,of the business on 
some lines, and (3) rush hour service, requiring peak 
loads causing losses. 
Ww. Alpert sees only one 'SOlution to the problem, 
"Public support of commuter services.n* 
The best arrangement ••• is to 
pay railroads the difference 
between the revenue and the 
cost of good service at reason- , 
able fares on vital commuter 
lines. iHr 
He sees the need for agreements between the 
railroads and public officials, stipulating the fares 
to be charged and the services to be provided, in-
cluding enough off-peak service to make it easy to use 
the train. Agreements would also have to be made con-
cerning the method of computing costs and provisions 
for needed improvements. 
ott 22, P.32 
if.* ibid 
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CHAPTER SIX 
THE NE\v HAVEN FORCES THE ISSUE 
THE NEW HAVEN ANNOUNCES DISCONTINUANCE OF SERVICE 
The New Haven ~orced the issue when on May 13, 
1958, the railroad announced that it intended to dis-
continue commuter service on the Old Colony ~e. It 
obtained a restraining order ~rom the United States 
District Court in New Haven prohibiting the of~icials o~ 
the Commonwealth o~ Massachusetts from interfering with 
the abandonment. The New Haven contended that it's 
losses in the operation o~ the Old Colony in 1957 amount-
ed to $2,400,000. 
ACTION BY THE COMMONWEALTH 
This brought an immediate reaction ~om the 
State House. The Attorney General, the late George 
Fingold, went to the District Court in New Haven and 
obtained a restraining order ~rom Judge Robert P. 
Anders. on. The order gave the Oommoni'real th a month to 
try to solve the problem. Mr. Fingold stated that the 
transportation o~ 8500 commuters was at stake, and he 
asked ~or an audit o~ the Old Colony's books. In the 
22 
meantime, the Massachusetts Genera~ Court established a 
Special Commission to investigate the problems incurred 
with the loss of the O~d Colony and to suggest some means 
of solving the problem.-' 
ACTION OF THE FEDERAL COURT 
On June 4, 1958, Judge Anderson, the presiding 
Justice of the United States District Court in New Haven. 
int'o.rmed Mr. Fingold that he expected quick action on 
the Old Colony and he said that he wou~d not allow an 
audit of the company's books after the June 23, 1958 
~ 
deadline that he had set. He stated that the Court had 
already determined the fact that the O~d Colony Line had 
suffered sufficient losses to allow for the discontinuance 
o:r the commuter service·~~ 
On June 23, 1958, hearings were reopened in 
the Federal Court. Mr. Charles Greenough, the MDC 
Commissioner, testified that the abandonment of the Old 
Colony would cause a serious traffic problem to the 
Metropolitan area, asserting that Morrisey Boulevard 
(the main route to the south shore area, the area to be 
. 
hardest hit) already carried 75,000 vehicles daily. 
However, Judge Anderson commented that Massachusetts 
had failed to offer any concrete suggestions· to keep the 
Old Colony ru.nning. · 
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HEARINGS OF THE SPECIAL LEGISLATIVE COMMISSION 
During this time, the Special Commission had 
been holding hearings, trying to do something to either 
keep the Old Colony or rind other methods of trans-
portation ror the people in the South Shore area. 
The Commission heard testimony from Lee Stack, 
a vice-president of the John Hancock Insurance Company. 
In 1946, Hancock loaned the New Haven $17 million for 
flood repairs. Mr. Stack told the Commission that if 
the New Haven did not get rid of the Old Colony, it 
would go broke in four months. Other witnesses, like 
Public Works Commissioner Anthony DiNatale who de-
scribed a monorail system that could be built at a cost 
of $650,000 a mile, suggested alternate means of trans-
portation. The Commission did other work, such as 
boarding an Eastern Massachusetts Street Railway bus for 
an unofficial and unannounced race with a New Haven train •. 
But nothing significant was done until June 26, 1958, 
when Judge Anderson invited various public officials of 
the Commonwealth to New Raven to discuss plans for the 
Old Colony. He also set Tuesday, July 8, 1958, at 
5:00 p.m. as the final date for the New Haven t.o be 
obligated to continue the Old Colony service. On the 
same day, the auditor appointed by the Attorney General 
stated that the New Haven had not overstated its losses. 
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As a result of the meeting with Judge 
Anderson, the Special Commission of the General 
Court hastily wrote its report and filed it with 
the General Court on June 30, 1958. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
THE SUBSIDY BILL 
COMPOSITION OF THE SPECIAL . COMMITTEE 
The Special Legislative Committee was com-
posed of five Senators, nine Representatives and four 
qualified men appointed by the Governor.# The Ohair-
man was Senator Jobn E. Powers, of Boston, currently 
President of the Senate. 
FINDINGS OF THE COMMITTEE 
The Committee was highly critical of the 
manner in which the United States District Court had 
handled the case. The report of the Committee states 
that Judge Anderson invited officials of the Common-
wealth to meet him to discuss the proceedings and 
plans to continue passenger service on the Old Colony. 
But, the report continues, the Jurist told the 
assembled officials that he intended to uenter an 
# The Governor's appointees were Calvin D. Crawford 
ot Cotuit, George A. Yarrington of Q,uincy, Henry 
W. Huddle.ston of Whitman and J. Burke Su.lli van of 
Hingham. 
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order ••• confir.ming the right o~ the New Haven Railroad 
to abandon passenger service on the Old Colony Lines."* 
Hence, the report states: 
••• the officials of the Common-
wealth present were confronted 
by a stark choice: They could 
either negotiate with the rail-
road, using the Chamber's (Boston 
Chamber of Commerce) plan as a 
basis for negotiation; or, they 
could permit passenger service 
to cease on the Old Colony Lines 
within a matter o:f a week. ·U·4t-
The Committee realized that the discontinuance 
o:f' the.'service on the Old Colony would result in serious 
traffic problems, loss of employment :f'or 700 workers, 
and many other undesirable consequences, such as a 
decline in property values in the South Station area. 
It was determined, through negotiations with officials 
o:f' the New Haven, that this loss of service could be 
avoided at a cost of about $900,000. Because of the 
poor bargaining position of the Commonwealth, it was 
felt that the state should make that amount available 
to the railroad as a subsidy for the continuance of the 
In order to provide for that payment, the 
Committee submitted recommended legislation to the 
General Court. 
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:EROVI.SIONS OF THE BILL 
The Bill* provided for the establishment of 
an Old Colony Area Transportation Commission in the 
Department of Public Utilities, which would be directed 
to make a contract with the New Haven Railroad on behalf 
of the Commonwealth. The contract would obligate the 
Commonwealth to pay the sum of $900,000 to the New Haven 
in four installments. In return, the New Haven would 
agree to (1) continue service on the Old Colony until 
July l, 1959, and (2) grant to the Commonwealth the 
option of purchasing the line from Boston to Braintree 
at the salvage value determined by the plan of re-
organization, which was approved in 1945. The Commission 
would also be charged with the duty of seeing that the 
New Haven performed 1 ts duties under the contract. 
The Bill specified that the communities served 
by the Old Colony would have to bear the burden of pay-
' 
ing for the continued service, thus, the proportion of 
each communities obligation was set forth. Boston would 
pay the- first $225,000, and the balance would be paid by 
the 37 other cities and towns. 
Other sections of the Bill authorized the 
Treasurer of the Commonwealth to borrow funds in antic-
ipation of payments by the communities, in order to meet 
*48 
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the State's contractual obligation of four equal in-
stallments to the New Haven. Another group, the Old 
Colony Transportation Advisory Council, would also be 
formed, consisting of the Mayors of the towns which had 
to pay the subsidy and the Chairmen of' the Board of 
Selectmen of these towns. Each member would be given 
a vote "in proportion to the amount, exclusive of' in-
terest or other charges, paid by his city or town ••• n ~• 
toward the deficit. The Council would be charged with 
the duties of making further recommendations to the 
General Court :for a solution to the transportation 
problem. 
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE BILL CHALLENGED 
There was ·some question as to the con-
stitutionality of the proposed Bill. Some felt that it 
might be construed to be a money bill, which according 
to Article VII, Section III of the Constitution of' 
Massachusetts u ••• shall originate in the House of' 
~ 
Representatives ••• n, while some wondered if the payment 
of money to the New Haven was a violation of Section I 
of Article LXII of the Amendments to the Constitution 
of Massachusetts, which states that u ••• the credit of the 
* 48, P;. 17 
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Commonwealth shall not in any manner be given or loaned 
to or in aid of any ~dividual, or of any private 
organization, or of any corporation wbich is privately 
owned or managed", and Article.X of the Declaration of 
Rights, Article IV of Section I and other provisions 
of the Constitution of Massachusetts, that public money 
may not be used except for a public service or a public 
use. Because of these uncerta~ties, it was decided 
to ask the opinion of the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts on these issues. 
OPINION OF SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
The Justices delivered their opinions to the 
General Court on July 15, 1958. The Court held that the 
Commonwealth was not extending credit to the New Haven. 
It was felt that the only grant of credit was being made 
by the New Haven, in accepting the payment in four in-
stallments. Because of the critical situation envisioned 
by the Special Co~ission, the Court held that this was, 
indeed, a public service. liThe transportation of the 
people at large in the district served ••• is a matter~ 
which the public and the government as the representatives 
of the people have an interest.* 
* 46, P. J.3 
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The Justices also held that the proposed legislation 
was not a money bill in the sense or the meaning given 
in the Constitution. It was, rather, a bill ror another 
purpose in which the raising of funds in the process, 
is an incidental matter. 11 Such taxes as are imposed 
locally to reimburse the Commonwealth ror expenditures 
made by it, are purely incidental to the main objects 
or the bill.n* 
CONTROVERSY OVER PROPOSED LEGISLATION 
It was, therefore, clear that the proposed bill 
was constitutional. But there was still great contro-
versy over the Bill itself. The members of the Special 
Commission expressed their dislike of the legislation that 
they themselves had to recommend, by stating that: 
No member or this Commission likes the 
idea or making a payment of #900,000, 
or, indeed, of any amount to the New 
Haven Railroad. Nothing in this report 
should be construed as an expression of 
confidence in the management or the New 
Haven Railroad ••• nothing herein should 
be construed as a commitment of any kind 
for any such arrangement beyond July 1, 
1959.** 
It was hoped, the report stated, that another 
* 46 P. 16 
** 48, I>. 9 
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solu~ion would be found, that the legislation was 
necessary only to gain a year's time to look for 
alternative solutions. Indeed, the majority stated that, 
··ui~ is felt that a year from now the Commonwealth will 
have more al~ernatives available to i~ if for no other 
reason than ~hat our highway program will be further 
advanced at that time."" 
Representa~ive John T. Driscoll of Boston 
submitted a minority report. While agreeing with a 
substantial part of the majority report, he stated that 
he was opposed to the great share of the tax burden that 
would have to be contributed by the City of Boston, and 
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more importantly, he felt that 11 ••• a subsidy, once started, 
will be continued indefinitly and in ever greater amounts •• 11 -tHt-
He felt that the proposed legislation represented a pre-
cedent, and he feared that it would be used again and 
possibly in o~her situations. 
As would be expected, the proposed legislation 
caused a :f'ur0r of excitement. The Greater Boston Chamber 
of Commerce gave the Bill it's full endorsement. John 
Volpe, President of the organization, stated that the 
shutdown of the Old Colony would cost the City of Boston 
* 48, P.9 
iHt- 48, P.ll 
taxes, jobs and business. He said that: 
As a former Commissioner of Public 
Works, I know that the inrlux of 
passenger cars on Boston's streets 
which will come about if-the Old 
Colony is shut down will make the 
city's present traffic and parking 
problema seem minor in comparison.* 
Others were not so enthusiastic about the 
plan. The Southeastern Massachusetts Economic Council, 
with a membership comprising of residents of sixty 
communities, stated that the plan would establish a 
practice which tl ••• we believe to be not only dangerous, 
but in contravention to the constitutional rights of 
the people.u-l~* The Committee further stated that the 
price of continued service on the Old Colony evidently 
was n ••• a subsidy which we strongly oppose and a surren,.der 
of our right to control our local expenditures.n** This 
Committee, like other groups, wanted continued service, 
but at no cost to the communities involved. 
Other opponents of the Bill consisted of repre-
sentatives o:f organized labor. J'ohn H. Leonard, :President 
of a local bus drivers union, stated that it is 11 un:fair 
to private bus companies to place a (fare) ceiling on 
. 
the Old Colony. The private bus companies will have to 
* 15, July 1, 1958 
*i~ 15, June 29, 1958 
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keep the same :ra.res to stay in business.n* Many state 
legislators, particularly from the City o:r Boston, pro-
tested the assesment made against Boston :ror the subsidy. 
In reply, Senator Powers, himself' :f'rom Boston, said that 
there is always the question o:f' 11 97.5% of the people 
paying :ror the transportation o:f' 2.5%, but the question 
involves the overall picture of public transportation 
and the economy of the entire area. 11 ** 
* 15, July 2, 1958 
~~-* 15, July 1, 1958 
CHAPTER EIGHT 
THE SUBSIDY IS GRANTED 
On July 9, 1958, the people of the Commonwealth, 
as well as the legislators on Beacon Hill, received a 
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real shock when the New Haven Railroad discontinued 
passenger service on the Old Colony Line. Commuters were 
told that the rai+road could not wait any longer for 
action on the Bill. Over 400 railroad workers were handed 
notices of indefinite furloughs and 90 trains were 
cancelled. Mr. Alpert stated f'latly that the Bill under 
consideration was not acceptable to the New Haven, and 
that it was not t.he plan that the railroad had agreed to 
with officials of the Commonwealth in New Haven. 
OBJECTIONS OF THE NEW HAVEN 
The chief objection that the New Haven seemed 
to have to the Bill was in the section concerning the 
right of Massachusetts to exercise an option to purchase 
the Boston Group lines under the reorganization-plan of 
1945. Mr. alpert did not like the wording of the Bill, 
because he thought that the State might later say that 
the $900,000 subsidy was a down payment in the exercise 
of the option. He was also dissatisfied with the slow 
progress and endless argument on the Bill·. 
REACTION AT THE STATE HOUSE 
T.he action was greeted with outcries o~ 
"dictatorship" on Beacon Hill. Attorney General Fingold 
went to the Court of Appeals in New Haven ana.. claimed 
that the railroact. haC!.. lost it 1s right to abanaon service 
unct.er the reorganization plan, because it ~ailect. to keep 
segregated the supposed loss figures o~ the Old Colony 
~rom the general statements of the New Haven. 
SERVICE RESTORED 
Anxious to prevent the prolonged discontinuance 
of service on the line, representatives of the Chamber of 
Commerce went to Mr. Alpert to try to persuade him to re-
establish it. Mr. Alpert was enraged by some of the 
statements made by legislators and the Governor of the 
Commonwealth.* But, through the e~forts of the Chamber 
members, and with assurances that the Bill would be 
passed, Vw. Alpert relented, and on July 10, 1958, ser-
vice on the Old Colony was restored. 
PASSAGE OF THE SUBSIDY BILL 
In the meantime, Mr. Powers was doing everything 
* 15, July 9, 1958 
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possible to accelerate passage of the Bill. Passed finally 
by the Senate, the House decided that the Bill in its 
present form was not acceptable. An amendment was added 
to the Bill which would require the State Auditor to audit 
the books of the Old Colony and require the railroad to 
submit quarterly reports on commuter line operations. 
The Senate refused to approve the Bill with the 
audit requirement. Initially, the New Haven said that it 
had no objection to the audit, but later, a company 
representative stated that the requirement would cost the 
railroad another $100,000 a year. 
The Bill was finally enacted into law on 
August 20, 1958, without the audit requirement. 
So, Massachusetts had won another reprieve. 
One year. The cost ••• $900,000. But the problem was not 
solved. 
CHAPTER NINE 
REPORT OF THE GREATER BOSTON ECONOMIC STUDY COMMITTEE 
In June, 1958, the Greater Boston Economic 
Study Committee issued a "Policy Statement 11 -ff> on 
commuting. The statement contains a brier resume of the 
commuter problem but does not offer any new suggestion to 
the specific problem of the railroad, other than to 
reiterate the oft-sung phrase that no one will take the 
train anymore. The Policy Statement is interesting, 
though, first because it was issued at the height or the 
Old Colony crisis, and second, because it does give some 
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valid reasons for the need of mass transportation facilities. 
The report states that over a half a million 
people move into and aut of downtown Boston everyday. Of 
this total, about 9% are carried on commuter trains, while 
57%, over one half or the total move by private automobile. 
The report attributes the decline in railroad passengers to 
increasing popularity of the automobile, and it is stated 
that u declining t.raffic in the race or rising wages and 
equipment prices has meant rising costs".** Because or the 
loss of short haul freight traffic to trucking firms, the 
report continues, freight earnings can no longer cover 
* 6 
** 6 p 10 
commuter losses. The report states that commuter linea 
should be replaced with an improved and expanded 
Metropolitan Transit Authority. What about subsidY 
paym.ents to railroads? The report states that: 
A public subsidy to the railroads, 
whether in the form of a direct subsidy, 
tax relief or public ownership and oper-
ation, does not go to the heart of' the 
problem. As long as the subsidy contin-
ues, it can perhaps prevent the railr·oada 
from abandoning ESSENTIAL commuter service. 
But it will fail to cure the underlying 
causes of the railroads' troubles, because 
it does nothing to make. commutation by rail 
more attractive to the commuting motorist.* 
Although attacking the idea of a subsidy at 
this point, it is later stated in the report that it 
would be wise for the state to give the railroads a 
guarantee that it will make up any failure of the rail-
road to meet out-of-pocket costa on longer distance 
commuter travel.*"., 
- ··~~ Many other it·ema are covered in the report 
and they should be of interest to anyone concerned 
with the overall problem of transportation in the 
Boston Area. Specific recommendations are made in 
regard to extention of some facilities of the MTA, 
including a proposal for a single transit authority. 
Electrification of the Old Colony is not suggested but 
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the use or a new type Diesel electric car, which can 
- -
operate above ground as a diesel and underground as 
electric cars, is recommended. 
CH.4.PTER TEN 
THE OLD COLONY AREA TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION 
The latest study made of the problem of 
commuting, as it affects the Old Colony, is contained 
in the First Report of the Old Colony Area Trans-
portation Commission.* 
STATUTORY AUTHORITY 
Chapter 663 of the ACTS of 1958, gave this 
Commission the re:sponsibility of making a ~tudy of 
Old Colony. Specifically, the Commission was charged 
with determining whether the present subsidy payment 
should be used as a basis for negotiating a new subsidy 
or if' the right way of the Old Colony should be pur-
chased and electrified. 
BASIC OBSERVATIONS MADE BY COMMISSION 
First, it is stated that the logical solution 
to the problem is to have a "single government agency 
with the power to regulate and to integrate highway 
planning, traffic control, public parking, and all types 
* 4-5 
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ll• 
of' public transportation within the area."*# Another 
observation made is tha.t the "ultimate goal (of' 
planning) is a single integrated system of rapid 
. 
transit lines to serve the entire Metropolitan Boston 
Area. "*-tl- But because of the :t'inancd.a.l di:t'ficul ties 
of the :MTA, the Commission felt that n ••• new rapid 
transit lines will have to be financed by independent 
transit districts ••• nifo*ifo 
ACTION TAKEN BY COMMISSION 
Fortified with these observations, and 
convinced that the railroad couid not provide 
commuter service because of the high costs, the 
Commission hired a firm of engineers to conduct a study 
on rapid transit on the Old Colony right of way. It is 
stated in the Report that the Commission realized that 
time was of the essence (an astute observation by the 
members after years of inaction by other groups) • The 
-
Commission recommends that an independent transit 
authority, to be called the South Shore Transit 
District, be established. This group would then be 
' ' ' 
* 45, p. 6 
# This, of course is nothing new, as it had been suggested 
in the Coolidge Reports and the Greater Boston Economic 
Study Committee. 
ifif 45, p. 7 
*** 45, P. 8 
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responsible for purchasing from the New Haven Railroad, 
.... the right-of-way, tracks, station 
buildings and all other appurtenances 
within the right-of-way of said rail-
road between Boston, the city at 
Quincy, and the town of Braintree, 
beginning at the point where the two 
Cape Cod (South Shore) tracks meet 
the tracks o:f the Boston Terminal 
Company in the city o:f Boston and end-
ing at the Y connection south of t.he 
South Braintree station where the 
Plymouth branch leaves the Cape Cod 
track in the t.own o:f Braintree ••• * 
Provisions are also made :for the purchase 
:from the New Haven of the Greenbush branch in the towns 
of Braintree, Weymouth, Hingham, Cohasset and Scituate, 
and the Cape Cod line in the t.owns o:f Braintree, Holbrook, 
Avon and Brockton. 
It is stipulated that the SSTD should make an 
agreement with the New Haven to provide for the joint use 
of certain track :for the movement of freight cars. The 
Commissioners would be responsible :for the electrification 
of the line, the acquisition of parking facilities 
adjacent to stations and agreements with the MTA covering 
connections. The rest o:f the proposals of the Commission 
are routine, covering the issuance of bonds, the hiring 
o:f employees and sundry other details, with the exception 
of two items which should be examined closely.# 
# These are the proposals referring to overpasses and 
deficit financing. A discussion of these items :follows 
this chapter. 
* 45, P.l9 
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It is the opinion of the Commission that the 
new Transit District will be self-supporting. Exhibit I 
is a reproduction of the Estimated Capital OUtlay needed 
to implement the Commission's pl~. Exhibit II shows the 
Estimated Alm.ual Operating Expenses of the plan, Exhibit 
III the Estimated Annual Revenues and Exhibit IV, the 
Estimated Annual Return. 
EXHIBIT I 
ESTJNA.TED CAPITAL OUTLAY* 
Additional trackage 
Gauntlet tracks 
Savin Hill Connection 
South Braintree Terminal Yard, Office 
Hingham Terminal 
Repair Shop (contract) 
Station Improvements . 
Electrification 
Catenary and feeders 
Sub-stations and transmission 
Way ~d Drainage · 
Right-of-way and Railroad facilities 
Boston to South Braintree 
Braintree-Greenbush (contract) 
Cars-66 MU coaches @ $120,000 each 
Service Cars (two used) 
Additional Engineering and Contingency Exp. 
Interest during construction 
Total Capital Outlay 
45, P.J.l}. 
825,000 
846,000 
490,000 
160,000 
80,000 
895,000 
985,000 
1,230,000 
182,000 
1,200,000 
7,920,000 
50,000 
1,960,000 
150,000 
. $19 a 935 a 000 
EXHIBIT II 
ESTIMATED ANNUAL OPERATING EXPENSES .,. 
Maintenance of way and structures 
Maintenance of equipment 
Power 
Transportation Labor 
Injuries and damages 
Depreciation of way and structures 
].1iscellaneous 
Fare credit to MTA (7,000,000 @ 20¢) 
Cost or service credit to MTA (6¢) . 
Total Annual Expenses 
EXHIBIT III 
# 234,000 
142,000 
140,000 
455,000 
28,000 8o,ooo 
77tOOO 
$1,156,000 l,4oo,ooo 
420,000 
$2,976,000 
ESTIMATED ANNUAL REVENUES (25,000 daily riders) ** 
Revenues from operations 
Revenue from railroad lease 
(Freight service to South Braintree) 
Total annual revenue 
EXHIBIT IT 
ESTIMATED ANNUAL RETURN *.,H. 
Total annual revenue 
Total annual expense 
Annual gross income 
Annual debt service charge 
($20,000,000 issue 40 years 3%) 
Annual Net Income 
* 45 P.l4 
.. f* 45 P.l5 
*** 45, :P. 15 
$4,115,000 
240,000 
$4,355,000 
$4,355,000 
2,976,000 
1,379,000 
865,000 
$ 514,000 
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COMMENTS ON COMMISSIONS FIGURES 
Although this report bas been available for 
at least two months, there has not been very much public 
discussion on it. -Of course, as the time draws near for 
t.he Old Colony to again issue an u1 timatum to the 
Commonwealth, the report will probably evoke some heated 
debate. 
No provisions have been made for repair shops 
in the estimated capital outlay. In the estimate of 
ann~al expenses of operating, only #28,000 is set. aside 
as funds for injuries and damage. In this day of high 
insurance claims, $28,000 would not be likely to cover 
the damages from one suit, and any transportation agency 
must expect many damage suits in the course of a year. 
In fairness to the authors of the report, it must be 
noted that the figures given are estimates and are subject 
to revision. There is another expense which does not 
appear in any of these estimates. It is a cost which 
will be borne by the whole Commonwealth. Section 9 of the 
proposed legislation stipulates that: 
All underpasses and overpasses required 
for elimination of grade crossings where the 
present railroad tracks cross existing public 
ways at the same level shall be designed and 
built by or under the direction of the Mass-
achusetts Department of Public Works and the 
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cost of such contruction shall be paid .from 
the general highway fund. All existing under-
passes and overpasses under or over the rail-
road.tracks (used· by the·Transit'District) 
shall become the property of the Massachusetts 
Department of Public Works ••• and the same shall 
be maintained, repaired 'and replaced when nec-
essary by the said department with monies from 
the general highway fund.~E-
It is difficult to determine the intent of 
the Commission in proposing.that the Department of 
Public Works build and maintain those prop,erties 
of the Transit District. It does represent a subsidy 
to the Transit line of substantial amounts, although 
the cost of the subsidy will presumably be buried in the 
gasoline taxes. 
Another provision of interest in the proposals 
of the Commission is Section 19, which provides for 
means of raising monies if the service does not operate 
at a profit. df course, this is a proposal to assess 
the towns and cities affected by the District an amount 
equal to the deficit. 
ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS IGNORED BY COMMISSION 
The legislation that charged the Old Colony 
Area Transportation Commission with the responsibility 
of measuring the advantages of purchasing the Old Col.ony 
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and electrifying it, also charged it with the responsibility 
* 45 p 21 
o~ determining whether or not the subsidization method 
o~ continuing commuter service was satisfactory. The 
Commission quickly turned this idea down with a comment 
that the railroads cannot do the job.-tf' 
No consideration is made o~ the economic effect 
on the City o~ Boston i~ the railroad ceased operations 
there. Nothing is said about the needs o~ the railroads 
in New England. Nothing is said about the neds of New 
England for the railroad. But is this not an important· 
~ac~or in any analysis of railroad commuter service? 
'-, 
*45, P. 7 
48 
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CHAPT:ER ELEVEN 
THE IMPORTANCE OF TRANSPORTATION IN BOSTON 
In the preceeding pages, the problem of the 
Old Colony has been discussed without too much reference 
to the role of railroad commuter transportation in the 
overall transportation problem of the city. This is 
understandable, for the Old Colony represents a pressing 
problem. However, it is important to remember that the 
transportation problem of the City of Boston exists be-
cause of certain very basic economic factors. The 
problem of the Old Colony cannot be properly solved with= 
out reference to those problemse Choosing the best al-
ternative for continuation of service to commuters on 
the South Shore today will not necessarily result in 
solving the problem that will be faced tomorrow. No 
solution to the transportation problem of the metropolitan 
area will be satisfactory unless basic decisions are made 
about the future of the downtown area. 
The central business district of the city is 
very small. .It consists mostly of office buildings, 
some hotels and a few manufacturing firms. The working 
force has moved in increasing numbers to the suburbs. 
So, twice a day, a mass movement of people occurs into 
and out of the city. At the same time, shopping centers 
have been established near the homes of these workers in 
the suburbs. Theatres and other amusement facilities are 
also relocating far from the core of the city. Therefore, 
there exists a demand for transportation twice a day in 
the city. To solve this portion of the problem, new 
concepts of urban development will have to be created. A 
better balance of population distribution should be 
effected. It is conceivable that if the city was attrac-
tive enough to live in, many people would think twice be-
fore moving to the suburbs. The City of Boston and the 
metropolitan area have the facilities for solving the 
short run transportation problem, (i.e. three excellent 
railroad systems and the MTA). The important problem lies 
in the area of urban redevelopment of which transporta-
tion is an important part. If comprehensive urban planning 
is not accomplished, today 1 s solution to the transporta-
tion problem will have no bearing on tomorrow. The 
community must decide on the role of the city in the 
metropolitan district. The problem is enormous. It 
has often been said that what Boston needs is a good-fire 
so we can start from scratch and build a modern city. 
But good, hard planning and the cooperation of the various 
governmental bodies in the State can take the place of the 
fire. A realization that Boston is not an island, but 
the core of a group of communities is needed before direct 
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action can be taken. There is no reason why Boston should 
not be a greater center for the arts, a better shopping 
center, and the best place to have an office building 
in this area. 
TRANSPORTATION IN THE DOWNTOWN AREA 
Some reference has already been made to data 
concerning the flow of traffic in the do1~town area. 
Because of their importance in discussing the needs of 
the city, further figures are presented here. These 
figures were compiled by the Research Bureau of Boston 
College and were presented at a citizens Seminar at the 
University.* 
From 1950 to 1956, motor vehicle travel in the 
downtown area increased 10%. The increase of motor 
vehicle use caused a decrease in the use of mass trans-
portation facilities. The MTAts losses amounted to about 
40,000 people a day. From 7:30 to 9:30 in the morning, 
70% of the people entering the downtown area use mass 
transportation facilities, but during the other hours of 
the day, excluding the evening rush hours, mass trans-
portation is virtually unused. 
An interesting factor mentioned in this seminar 
*7 
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is that ir everyone came to Boston by motor vehicle, 
three times as many parking spaces would be needed. 
This would require an expenditure by the City in excess 
of $200,000,000 and would require taking over 40% of 
the business blocks of the City for parking (assuming 
6 story garages were built). Added to this is the fact 
that. 50% of the land ar.ea in the downtown section is al-
ready devoted to motor vehicle facilities. 40% of the 
land is used for streets and highways. 10% is used for 
parking. Because of the scarcity of land in the area, 
these figures represent a serious loss of revenue for 
the City and an increasing burden or maintenance expenses. 
PROBLEMS OF OTHER RAILROADS IN BOSTON 
The commuter problem is not confined to just 
one railroad in Boston or just one area. The Boston and 
Albany Railroad, which is part of the New York Central 
System, and the Boston and Maine Railroad are both 
plagued with the same problems. No subsidies have been 
requested by either of these lines, but service on both 
has been drastically reduced. The New Haven has felt more 
of an obligation to continue service, even though it has 
had to ask for rinancial support to carry on. Therefore, 
while this study has been devoted to analyzing the Old 
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Colony problem, the reader should remember that commuters 
from all parts o:f the State, coming into Boston, are 
affected. It is just a matter o:f time before action will 
have to be taken to preserve commuter service on the other 
lines. 
THE IMPORTANCE OF RAilROAD TRANSPORTATION TO THE CITY 
Senator Powers recently stated that, "on 
transportation alone, our city (Boston) can rise or 
:fall. "-tf> Senator Powers has thus aligned himself behind 
the need :for subsidies to transportation companies in 
order to continue this important service. 
Boston's need :for industry is obvious. It has 
been pointed out that more and more automobiles are 
coming into the city every day, and there is a definite 
relationship between tt ••• good traffic conditions and 
good business ••• when traffic piles up, sales :fall o:f:f ••• 
and ••• as the hunt :for a parking space becomes savagely 
competitive, business moves into the suburbs. 11** 
THE MTA PROBLEM 
One proposed solution to the problem is 
•• 16, P. 8 
lifo# 21, P. 12 
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the establishment of a new transit authority or the ex-
tension of the :M.TA. What does this proposal mean to the 
City of Boston? 
At the present time, Boston bears the heaviest 
portion of the deficit burden of the MTA. In 1958, the 
MTA suffered a deficit of $15,.780,896. Boston must pay 
65% of that deficit, or $10,878,301. (The deficit t'or 
1958 was $4,366,083 above the deficit for 1957. It re-
presented an increase in the tax rate of Boston of $2.10 
a thousand, and brings the total cost of the MTA to the 
Boston taxpayer to $7.48 per thousand of his real estate 
valuation). 
By comparison, Boston had to contribute only 
$225,000 to the $900,000 Old Colony subsidy (25%). And 
this money actually produced tax revenue for the city. 
Boston re·aeives over J.i million dollars in 
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taxes each year from the New Haven Railroad. This is based 
on the 1958 tax rate of $93. It is about three times 
the amount of money spent by the City on the subsidy. 
Mayor Hynes has repeatedly stated that discontinuance 
of commuter service on the Old Colony Railroad would 
mean that South Station would have to be reassessed, with 
a resultant large decrease in tax revenue for the City. 
President Alpert has gone even further, stating that if 
the New Haven were forced to discontinue commuter service 
on the Old Colony, .South .Station would probably not be 
used by his railroad at all. New Haven trains would stop 
at Back Bay, ~or there would be no justi~ication ~or go-
ing all the way to town. Ir this should happen, said 
Mr. Alpert, it would ujeopardize and ef~ect the entire 
South Station area ••• and Boston would be just one step 
more advance toward it's return to the village state that 
it occupied 150 years ago. 11# 
That idea might be a little strained, parti~ 
cularly if commuter service were replaced by a rapid 
transit line. However, the fact remains that Boston will 
lose over $1,000,000 a year in tax revenue, money that is 
padly needed. There is, in addition, no guarantee that 
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the City will not be asked to share a portion of a rapid 
transit dericit for the benefit o~ the .South Shore Authority 
that has been proposed. 
OTHER FACTORS IN THE BOSTON AREA 
The movement of business to the suburbs has been 
mentioned. This movement is of vit~l concern to the City, 
for the growth and well being o~ any community is de-
pendent on a sound central business area. 
# These comments were made by Mr. Alpert during a 
radio interview on ~~BMAKERS 1959, Station WBZ, 
Boston 
If the mass means of commutation are allowed to 
be abandoned, what other costs would Boston be faced with? 
There would have to be more off-street parking. Garages 
cost money and are, in effect, subsidized ventures. 
Valuable land is taken to build them on and no tax money 
is generated from them. Streets would have to be widened 
and the steadily increasing use would cause more rapid 
deteriorization and replacement. 
THE IMPORTANCE OF RAilROADS TO NEW ENGLAND 
The New England region, as a whole, is more 
-
dependent on good transportation facilities than other 
areas of the nation. Producers in this section of the 
country are already at a competitive disadvantage with 
oth~ producers because of the high cost of transportation. 
Raw materials and fuel must be shipped into this area and 
manufactured goods must be sent from here to other parts 
of the country. Good transportation is a necessity. The 
railroads that serve the New England area must be kept 
solvent. Continuation of unprofitable service, such as 
commuter service, will not help the competitive position 
of the railroads. 
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CHAPTER TWELVE 
THE EXPERIENCE OF OTHER AREAS 
COMMUTER PROBLEM IS NATIONWIDE 
The railroad commuter problem is not unique 
in the City of Boston. Metropolitan areas throughout 
the nation are experiencing the same difficulties. Let 
us first see what makes people turn from railroad commuter 
transportation and what would tempt them to return to it. 
Then we will examine action taken in two other metropol-
itan areas. 
SURVEY AMONG DRIVERS 
In an effort to find out how people felt about 
the problem of transportation to work, Fortune magazine 
conducted a survey among drivers in large cities.* The 
cities chosen were Los Angeles, San Francisco, and Wash-
ington, D. C. The drivers responses, reproduced below, 
give us some insight of the motivations of commuters who 
chose to use their automobiles for transportation to 
work. 
* 1, P. 53 
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QUESTION 
1. How do they feel 
about their work trip. 
a. Do not enjoy driving 
in todays traffic; would 
almost certainly switch 
to public transportation 
if it came reasonably close 
to competing with auto in 
times cost, convenience. 
b. Driving to work 
convenient; but would 
seriously consider 
switching to a first class 
transit system 
c. Enjoy driving: cannot 
imagine switching to public 
transportation. 
2 • Could now use public 
transportation but do not. 
3. Believe transportation 
and traffic problem best 
solved in their area by: 
a. New public rapid 
transit 
b. New highway 
4. Type of transit preferred 
a. Bus 
b. Rail 
5. Would use transit system 
of choice ~f: 
a. Round trip time matched 
present driving time. 
b. Only if it offered a 
substantial round tri~ 
saving (10-60 minutes) 
c. Doubt if use under any 
circumstance. 
6. Faets about present 
auto trip: 
a. Car pool 
66% 
34% 
35% 
65% 
64% 
19% 
17% 
12% 
39% 
39% 
90% 
21% 
79% 
68% 
18% 
14% 
46% 
WASH. 
37% 
85% 
41% 
59% 
22% 
18% 
54% 
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QUESTION 
.6!:· .§..:£:. WASH • 
b. Average one way 
11.4 14.1 distance in miles 9.1 
c. Average time home 
to work (minutes) 27 29.5 28.5 
d. Work to home 
(minutes) 32.5 33.5 33.5 
e. Average speed 
16 homeward 21 25 
NOTE: 1958 population figures for L.A., 1,970,358; 
775,360; Washington, 902,178;Boston, 801,444'. S .F., 
Thus over half of the present drivers 
would either switch or seriously consider switching to 
another means of transportation, if it was of good 
quality • Well over half of the drivers could now use 
mass transportation facilities, but. do not. It must be 
concluded, therefore, that they do not consider those 
facilities to be adequate. There is an overwhelming 
preference for rail transit service among the drivers 
interviewed, and only about 15% stated that they would 
not consider using this type of service. 
San Francisco is the only city of the three 
with transportation problems roughly similar to Boston. 
But the survey does indicate how some drivers in a few 
major cities feel about the probillem. 
OPERATION NORTHWEST 
Philadelphia has tried to solve its commuter 
59 
problem with close cooperation between railroads and 
city officials. 
The Chestnut Hill linea of the Pennsylvania 
and Reading Railroads is the main commuter line of the 
city. Operation Northwest was launched in October 1958, 
in an effort to ease the cities traffic problem and get 
the shoppers and commuters out of their cars and 0nto 
mass transportation facilities. 
Under this plan, which is really an experiment, 
riders on the Chestnut Hill line pay only a 30~ fare, 
instead of fares ranging up to 54~, which had been in 
effect. The rider is allowed to transfer to or from 
buses and trolleys of the Philadelphia Transit Company 
for only 10~ instead of the former 18~ or 20~. More 
frequent train service is also an important feature of 
the plan. 
SUCCESS OF PROGRAM 
The figures for the first fourteen weeks of 
the plan indicate that the program is meeting with wide-
spread public approval and acceptance. During that 
period, 42,082 MORE passengers were carried than in the 
same period in 1957- 1958. In addition, eight bus 
routes, which feed into Germantown area stations of the 
Chestnut Hill lines, have also shown steady passenger 
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increases. The city is paying $160,000 during the 
test period, most of the money being used for 218 
additional trains. It has been estimated that there 
will have to be a 30% increase in passenger traffic in 
order to offset the reduction in fares.* 
The experiment is not over, but it represents 
a concrete effort to do something about the problem. It 
represents cooperation between city government and the 
railroads, something that has not been in evidence in 
the Boston area. 
NEW YORK COM.rJIUTER PROBLEM 
Of the nine railroads that serve the New York 
area, six have been in bankruptcy. The Long Island 
Railroad, the largest commuter road in the nation, 
operates only because New York State and the localities 
that it serves have been abating about one half of it's 
taxes. So again, the railroads problems are financial. 
Like other commuter railroads, the New York railroads 
have suffered from lagging fare adjustments, decreased 
revenue, increased costs, destruction of intrinsically 
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valuable capital investment, delayed expansion of 
facilities and poor maintenance of equipment. 
The problem in New York is particularly 
difficult because commuters from three states are in-
volved. Connecticut, New York, and New Jersey all have 
a share in the problem. This had led some to attempt 
to create a tri-state agency to deal with the problem, 
but this has met with little real success. The gover-
nors of those three states have met repeatedly to try 
to work out a solution. New Jersey passed a bill auth-
orizing the creation of a bi-state agency (with New York) 
but the bill specifically forbids the taxation of local 
property holders to pay for deficits on commuter roads. 
With the many diverse points of view there, and the com-
plexity of the whole problem, there has been much con-
fusion. In a speech delivered in Chicago before trans-
portation experts, Mayor Wagner of New York called for 
income tax deductions for commuter fares. 
The New Haven is asking New York for a subsidy, 
similar to the one that it received from the Common-
wealth of Massachusetts. President Shoemaker of the 
Delaware, Lackawana and Western said that his railroad 
lost more than $800,000 from all operations in the first 
months of 1959, after losing $3,934,000 last year. 
62 
I 
'!'he Delaware, Laekawana. and. W~stern serves 20,000 
New Jersey commuters daily, anld is an important part 
I 
of New York1 s transportation ~omplex. Mr. Shoemaker 
I 
stated that his road should g~t full tax relief on all 
property and facilities used ~or passengers; broader 
latitude on curtailment o:f sfices, and. joint pa;yment 
by the State and the Port of ~ew York Authority for out-
of-pocket losses incurred by ~he railroad on service 
I 
which the community requires. Mayor Wagner has stated 
his support for income tax de uctions for commuter fares 
and subsidies to the railroad • He is also in favor 
of federal aid for the railro and in this respect, 
he has support ~om Major Gen al George Hickman, 
who, speaking for the SecretJy of the Army before a 
Congressional Committee statear that the railroad passenger 
service is vital tor the defe,se of the United States. He 
said that, nit is clear that r:ailroad passenger equipment 
has approached a point where J::ther reductions may 
- I 
impair the national defense. uJI In case of war, the mass 
movement of troops will depe~J on railroad facilities. 
Mayor Wagner believjs that because o:f the vital 
interest that the federal goveii'nment has in continued 
* 18 
63 
64 
I 
railroad opera~ion, federal s4bsidies should be gran~ed. 
I He sugges~s ~ha~ these could be in ~he form of low 
I 
in~eres"t ra~e loans ~o ~he ra~lroads or in a guaran~ee 
of bonds of an appropriate in~ersta~e authority, ou~side 
~he federal debt limit.* 
But, like Boston, N w York has not done any-
thing concrete in solving her commuter problem. The Ci~y 
is looking toward "the State, ,he State toward other S~ates, 
and everyone at the Federal Gqvernment. The problem 
remains. • 
* 19 
. I THE PROBLEM:BESTATED 
i 
SUMMARY OF THE PROBLEMS DISCUSJED 
:-
We have discussed th _ importance of passenger 
revenues to the New England ra lroads. In detail, we have 
studied the commuter problem !d it 1 s effect on the New 
I • 
Haven Railroad and the City o:J:ost~n. The Coolidge 
Report, with it 1 s plea f'or a 
1 
f'ied transit authority, 
• I 
has been studied together withjreports of' other economic 
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study groups. An examination ias been made of tb.e evolution 
of' a subsidy payment to the Ne Haven and it 1s effects. 
The latest efforts of' the Old tolony Area Transportation 
Commission have been mentioned and a brief' excursion was 
made to study the commuter pro~lem in other metropolitan 
areas, and to study their proptsals in the light of their 
own situations. 
Other proposals havelbeen made to solve the 
commuter problem. The remaindtr o:f this study will be 
devoted to discussing these various proposals. 
PROPOSALS TO SOLVE COMMUTER PR~BLEM 
l. Creation o:f a se~arate transit authority 
to purchase the right-of'-way o~ the Old Colony. (This 
I 
would presumably be used as a ~recedent for the esta-
blishment of other transit autJorities in other sec-
tions o~ the metropolitan area). 
2. The extention of the responsibilities of 
the present MTA in Boston to 1 
transit trains on the Old Colo 
3. The continuation 
sidy to the Old Colony by the 
4. Payment of a sub 
operation of rapid 
the payment of a sub-
the Federal Govern-
ment. 
5. Government owner1h1p of the railroad. 
6. Relaxation of go,ernment regulation of 
railroads, permitting them to ~ave more latitude in 
determining their own policy. 
7. Encouragement by the public to the rail-
roads to consolidat.e operatic in order to gain economies 
of scale. 
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CHAPTER FdURTEEN 
THE PROPOSALS STUDIED 
TRANSIT AUTHORITIES 
Proposals have been ,ade for the extension of 
the authority ot the MTA and for the creation of a sep-
arate transit authority. Both bf these plans would en-
tail the purchase of the existi~ right-of-way of the 
Old Colony Railroad, and the el1ect.rification of the lines. 
I 
I 
It might, therefore, be appropr~ate to consider the pro-
posal for outright government OWnership at this time. 
I 
GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP 
i 
Historically; the Ame~:-ican public has never been 
I 
receptive to the i~ea of outrig~t government ownership of 
i 
any industry. There is no doubi; that government owner-
' 
ship of railroads in France; Germany and other European 
nations has had a beneficial effect on their whole economy. 
I have had the good fortune of travelling on European 
J trains, as a third and second cfass passenger as well as 
I 
first class. In terms of converience, comfort and service, 
it is difficult to compare the railroads in Europe, which 
are much more efficient, to railroads in the United States. 
But would government owner ship · e the best al terna ti ve in 
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our situation? Is there any rJason to believe, that as 
conditions presently exist, thJt the government could 
offer sufficient savings in the operation of the railroad 
to make it worthwhile? Who wo ld benefit? 
RIDERS MIGHT BENEFIT 
One of the chief obj ctions of the riders of 
commuter railroads is that the have not been willing to 
pay for the actual cost of ser Presumably, with 
government ownership, fares wo. kept at a minimum. 
This has been the experience w th the MTA which has a 
flat 15~ local fare and 20~ 't ansfer' fare. The cost 
of the service is borne by the property owners and not 
the riders. 
RAILROADS MIGHT BENEFIT 
have been losing money on the peration of commuter lines 
would breathe a sigh of if the government took 
over only the commuting s. It is equally certain, 
going a step further, that the would scream loudly if 
the government took over the p ofitable freight service. 
This the railroads deem to be heir own domain. 
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COMMUNITY MIGHT BENEFIT 
• 
i 
There \"{OUld certainl~· be advantages for the 
I 
community in that there would ie a guarantee ot continued 
commuter service. Better schequling of trains and the 
ability of the government to u.Je it.' s taxing power to 
obtain funds for new equipment would make the service 
more attractiv~. However, the increased tax burden on 
businessmen and· property owner in 
this advantage. Someone will Jave 
I 
PARTIAL GOVERNMENT 01vNERSHIP 
the city might negate 
to pay for the service. 
The Coolidge Report Jnvisions only partial 
government ownership, that is~jownership and operation 
of commuter service only throu h rapid transit. The 
railroads would continue to op~rate long haul passenger 
service and freight service. tis.would, of course, put 
the burden of both ownership arid operation of those lines 
on the governing bodies of the lcomm~nities served. The 
Coolidge Commission felt that railroads could not 
handle the short haul commuter but that a local 
transit authority could not handle it effectively 
but would also make a The Commission applied 
the same reasoning to the transit lines within the 
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City (The Elevated Railway) from their recommendations, 
the MTA was born. The MTA has not only been unable to 
operate at a profit, but it 1 s dlficit has become more and 
more of a burden each year on t[e communities that it 
serves. For someone must pay for the service, if not 
the riders, then the taxpayers. No matter who the re-
cipient of a subsidy might be, private railroad or 
a publicly owned transit line, he government must ob-
tain funds from the taxpayers tr make the payment.s. 
By limited government ownership of-transpor-
tation facilities, we are referring to ownership of a 
segment of those facilities, inl this case, ownership and 
control of commuter transportatlon service. The pro-
posed legislation which would ektablish an independent 
South Shore Transit Authority wbuld be an example of this 
type of ownership. The railroa s would ret~in their 
freight service and long-haul p ssenger service. Again, 
as in the case of government o~1ership, better scheduling, 
lower cost of service (to the rider) and some benefits to 
the community might result. Thi question remains for this 
area, Can an independent authority really do the job? If 
we speak~ terms o2 grant~g alsubsidy if the authority 
does not operate at a profit, tfen there would be no 
question. But the elimination !'fa subsidy or the dis-
continuance of a subsidy to a p,ivate firm is not the 
only question. One of the prim reasons for concern is 
the increased congestion in the City of Boston caused by 
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the great influx o~ automobiles. Merely trans~erring 
the ownership and control of t~e commuter lines ~rom 
private hands to the gover:nmen~ v-rill not ease this 
tra~~ic. The ~inal solution problem must include 
methods of making travel by ~~·~~.~ o~ mass transportation 
more desirable by private auto-
mobile. 
In the :present situa in Boston, there are 
two ways in which the public c become owners of the 
commuter services. The e 
Transit Authority is one 
responsibilities of the MTA 
implementation of either of 
improve the type of service 
the South Shore 
expansion of the 
other. But, would the 
methods materially 
? As in the case of 
government ownership, better s uling and more certain 
service would :probably result. But would the service im-
prove enough to lure away from their auto-
mobiles? Of course, the answer. The MTA 
will probably be helpful in ans At 
best, anything that we can say this :point would be 
merely conjectual. does remain clear that the 
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I 
I gets discouraged by the crowdinf techniques emp~oyed bl 
the ~ine, i.e. packing as many people as possible into 
I' 
each car. Certainly the rai~roaa commuter, used to riding 
i 
on a train with two abreast seating, will not be enthu-
siastic over being herded like the present MTA rider. 
Improvement in service is the k~y to retaining and re-
I 
gaining the commuter to the rails, regardless of who offers 
the service. 
EASING GOVERl\JMENT REGULATION 
The nation's railroad~ are today one of the most 
heavily regulated industries. ~brief study of some of the 
I 
I 
areas of government interest and control Will suffice to 
I support this contention. 
I 
INFLUENCE OF GOVERNMENT ON WAGEt2. 
Wages constitute abou~ one-half of the total 
operating costs of the railroadf, and the government in-
fluences those wages through prfvisions of the National 
Railway Labor Act. Under this ~ct, certain agencies pass 
on interpretations of wages andlhour contracts of the 
railroads and their employees. !More imp?rtant, there is 
no coordination between the bodies that influence the 
! 
wages and the bodies that grant
1
fare increases. When a 
fare increase is actually to pay for a wage in-
crease, the time lag between two may represent a 
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serious drain on the working capital of the railroad. 
CONTROL OVER RATES 
The Interstate Commerce Commission, as well as 
state regulatory commissions (such as the the Depart-
ment of Public Utilities in Massachusetts), exercises 
a very high degree of control o·v·er the nation 1 s rail-
roads. All proposed rates and fares must be filed by the 
railroads with the appropriate State or Federal agency. 
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The regulatory commissions may suspend rates, hold hearings, 
and may actually set minimum and maximum rates which the 
railroads may charge for their services. 
GOVERNMENT TAXING POLICIES 
In addition to the control exercised over the 
revenues of the railroad inherent in the rate fixing 
policy of the regulatory agencies of the government, the 
special taxes placed on the railroad and railroad ser-
vices also furnish the government with positive controls 
over earnings. Taxes are paid on all physical property 
(as opposed to other common car'riers '"Tho pay taxes only 
on their vehicles and warehouses but use public facilities 
for their 'right-of-w·ay 1 , i.e. the highways). 
- -1------
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GOVERNMENT REPORTING REQUIREMENTS 
For many years, railroads have been req~ired to 
submit detailed statements to state and federal regulatory 
agencies. These reports are executed according to pre-
scribed proced~res established by the agencies. This gives 
these bodies complete statistical data on the operation of 
the railroads. This is necessary in order to exercise the 
s~pervision and control that the agencies have over the 
railroads. 
GOVERNMENT CONTROL OVER RAILROAD SAFETY 
The ICC has extensive jurisdiction in the matter 
of railroad safety. It regUlates the number of hours that 
railroad employees may 1vork, the. safety of the railroad 
equipment, and the p~oper maintenance of' safety equipment, 
incl~ding switches, signals and other automatic devices. 
All accidents must be reported to the ICC and are subject 
to investigation. 
GOVERNMENT CONTROL OVER MERGERS 
Government control over the securities of the 
railroads is complete. All security issues must meet the 
approval of the ICC and all transactions in railroad 
securities by the railroads in this country are subject 
to ICC scrutinization. In addition, the Commission has 
I ---
comple~e authority over mergers and consolida~ions, 
having the power ~o approve or disapprove ~hem. 
OTH:ER GOVERNMENT CONTROLS 
Two other impor~an~ governmen~ controls are ~he 
jurisdiction of sta~e regulatory commissions over the dis-
con~inuance of unprofi~able service in intras~ate traffic 
and the jurisdiction of ~he ICC over all abandonmen~s. 
THE NECESSITY OF GOVERNMENT CONTROLS _ 
The governmental con~rols that have been lis~ed 
are certainly vi~al to the continuation of service, par-
~ieularly in metropoli~an areas. While i~ may be true 
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~ha~ certain of ~hese controls, or elements of the controls, 
(like taxing policies) should be changed, ~he overall effec~ 
of government regula~ion is ~o assure uniform, fair, ser-
vice to all users of railroad transpor~a~ion. There is 
no doubt that there would be no service on ~he Old Colony 
~oday if i ~ were no~ for ~he intervention of governmen~ 
agencies. The Old Colony would have been abandoned year a 
ago. 
-- -
CONSOLIDATION OF-RAILROADS 
There has been much discussion recently over 
the advantages of consolidation of New England railroads. 
Many good arguments have been advanced for this course of 
action, and indeed, many people think that consolidation 
will help solve the commuter problem. 
ADVANTAGES OF CONSOLIDATION 
The probable effects of a merger on the Old 
Colony and other commuter lines in Boston are not too 
clear. However, proponents of consolidation say that it 
would accomplish the following: 
1. The financial structure of railroads could 
be better integrated. This would lead to better long 
range planning and a reduction in t.he amount of working 
capital required for the expansion of services. 
2. Substantial savings could be made in oper-
ating expenses and interest charges. 
3. Many overhead expenses of the consolidated 
railroads would be reduced. 
4. Equipment on a consolidated, integrated 
system could be put to most efficient use. There would 
be no duplication of effort. 
5. Policies and rate making would be simplified. 
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6. There would be possib.ili ties of reducing the 
number of non-operating employees. 
7. Government regulation would be simplified. 
These advantages would accrue to any type of 
industrial combination. It is important to decide whether 
or not the consolidation of New England railroads would 
be desirable from an economic point of view, and whether 
such consolidation would have any effect at all on the 
problem at hand, the commuter problem. 
DISADVANTAGES OF CONSOLIDATION 
The disadvantages of a combination of New 
England railroads are well summed up in a report made to 
the New England Governors by the Governor's Committee 
on Public Transportation.* The report states that: 
*3 
Impressed with the valuable contri-
bution of competition as a means of stimu-
lating effeciency and promoting better ser-
vice and lower rates, your committee con-
cludes that competition should be retained 
to the extent that it now prevails among 
the New England railroads. 
Careful consideration has been given 
to the merits of consolidating the Boston 
and Maine and the New Haven (the two major 
commuting lines in Boston) and it has been 
found that such a merger would not be in 
the best interests of New England. 
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Combination of the two would destroy im-
portant competition that now exists at the 
common points now served as well as at other 
points ••• While there would be some economies in 
operation, some of them could probably be 
achieved by closer cooperation. Consolida-
tion would mean a combining of similar 
weaknesses which can be overcome better 
through independent managements working 
intelligently and assiduously in their limit-
ed spheres and in the circumstance peculiar to 
each carrier. No financial advantage would 
be realized by combining carriers that already 
have poor credit standings and cannot indiv-
idually attract capital for modernization of 
plant •••• ,. 
Based on the advantages and disadvantages listed 
above, there would be no value to consolidation from the 
point of view of better or more efficient service on 
commuter lines. In addition, it must be remembered t.hat 
t.he commuter lines servicing Boston all come from different 
directions. While some economies might exist, it is ex-
t.remely difficult to measure them and they fail to seem 
too important in arriving at a solution of the commuter 
problem. In some respects, it might add to the problem, 
for the railroad interests would be much st.ronger and would, 
therefore, be able to negotiate with the public on the 
basis of increased strength and power. This would not be 
desirable for the community. Certainly, for the short run, 
a scheme permitting consolidation of the railroads in New 
* 3, l'. 8 
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England would do nothing towards solving the commuter 
problem. 
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CHAPTER FIFTEEN 
SUBSIDIZATION 
Before going into details on the question of 
subsidization, the element of emotionalism connected 
with the concept must be eliminated. Here again, 
80 
editorial comments, letters to editors and public comments, 
all too often stress the emotional aspects of government 
aid without reference to the real issue involved. 
SUBSIDIZATION IS NOT EVIL 
First, the notion that the payment o:f a subsidy 
to a railroad (or any other industry) represents social-
ism and is there:fore bad should be dismissed. A. M. 
Ro sentha.l in his essay 11 SHOULD SOCIALISM BE A SCARE WORD?"* 
stated that "Many people equate socialism with communism, 
giving rise to confusion and error • 11 if-* Many times we 
have heard men earnestly warning the nation that we are 
'on the road to socialism'. 
It is not the purpose of this paper to measure 
the relative advantages of one form of political system 
against another. But it is important, in a discussion 
* 38 
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of subsidies, to remember that many people do fear 
'creeping socialism'. And, when the General Court of 
the Commonwealth decided to grant a $900,00 subsidy 
to the New Haven, many similar gasps of socialism were 
heard. 
Social legislation is not evil, per se. 
Therefore, in a discussion of subsidies to railroads, 
it is not enough to dismiss the alternative of such a 
payment because of it's socialistic nature, if in fact, 
a subsidy is needed. 
There is no question that when the crisis of 
the discontinuance of commuter service occured in 1958, 
the State had no alternative. Without the subsidy pay-
ment, railroad commuter service would have been lost and 
a vacuum would have existed. But now alternatives 
exist and the concept of a subsidy paym?nt must be 
measured against those alternatives that prove to be 
workable. 
OPPONENTS OF SUBSIDIES 
Not all railroad men are in favor of granting 
government subsidies to the railroads, and they have 
raised their voices in protest against it. Clair M. 
Roddewig, President of the Association of Western 
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Railroads has stated that, 11 As soon as you give a subsidy 
you are perpetuating inefficiency; you have destroyed 
the incentive to economize ••• (subsidies are) a short out 
to government ownershipn .<it- H .. E. Simpson of the 
Baltimore and Ohio Railroad has repeatedly stated that 
there would be no need for a subsidy if the government 
would apply the same regulatory rules to all forms of 
public transportation,.~t-* This would include the same 
rules, similar taxes and the recognition of the prin-
ciple of self support. Mr. Simpson points out that the 
excise tax on the transportation of people and freight 
was applied during World War II in order to keep people 
and goods other than military off the trains. The tax 
accomplished that purpose then, he ·said, and it is doing 
"the same thing today.*** 
While we know that there is no excise tax on 
commuter 1 s fares, we must yet bear in mind that the 
commuter business is just one segment of the railroads 
total business. If the railroads were making more money 
on other operations, they would not be trying so desper-
ately to get rid of the unprofitable commuter service. 
In fact., they might be able to make the commuter business 
* 33, p. 83 
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more profitable if there were funds available to make· 
the needed improvements in service. 
George Alpert of the New Haven has been a 
consistent champion of the subsidy payment to the rail-
road. It is his contention that the public needs the 
service, but the railroad just cannot afford the losses 
that the continuation of the service would ~ing. There-
fore, whereas the service is so important to the public, 
the public should be willing to pay for part of the cost. 
In opposition to the position taken by Mr. Roddewig, Mr. 
Alpert has stated that the US Merchant Marine and the 
Airlines have been subsidized for years. Socialization 
of these industries is not in sight in the near future.* 
In the preceding pages, elements of government 
regulation of the railroad industry were discussed. It 
is important now, to discuss how the railroads' compet-
itors are regulated. Are the railroads up against any 
-
unfair advantage in offering passenger and freight serv-
ice? (Once again, it must be remembered that the fi-
nancial position of the railroad will determine it's 
attitude toward continued commuter passenger service. 
One cannot isolate one factor from the other. Our imme-
diate concern is still the local situation, but these 
* 39 
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other factors, heretofore mentioned, must be considered.) 
The Association of American Railroads feels 
that their companies are over-regulated. In a bulletin 
published in 1958,* the Association presented the 
favorable division of editorial comment on the subject 
of railroads from the first of March to the end of June, 
1958. A total of 4,537 newspaper editorials were culled 
from the nations' press on various phases of the rail-
road situation. The first subject, discussed by 1488 
editorialists, concerned regulation. Of the 1488 edito• 
rials on this subject; 1434-, or 99% felt that todflyts 
regulations are out of date. The second phase concerned 
subsidized competition. Of 522 editorials on this sub-
ject, 509 expressed the opinion that such competion 
places an unfair burden on the railroads. 603 editorials 
of 6o8 on the subject of taxation stated that the rail-
roads are unfairly taxed, while 984 out of a total of 
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987 editorials dealing with the question of wartime federal 
excise taEes on transportation, favored the removal of 
those taxes. On this vital issue of whether or not the 
railroads should be allowed to dispense with deficit op-
erations, 1151 out of 1301 said 'yes'. 111 said •no•, 
while 39 said that they were not sure. 
-Of course, it cannot be said that editorial comments 
alone reflect the will of the people, but there must be 
some public support for easing the financial burdens of 
the railroads for the figures are overwhelming in their 
accord. 
SUBSIDIZED COMPETITION 
The nation1 s railroads have been suffering 
from the effects of subsidized competition for many 
years. In 1946, Professor William J. Cunningham of 
the Harvard Graduate School of Business stated that: 
The government itself is in 
the transportation business. It is 
furnishing facilities and service to 
some carriers at less than cost, But 
not to others ••• 
The question of the equity of 
taxation is a difficult one in any 
field. It is particularly vexatious 
in connection with the transportation 
agencies because of the :fact that some 
of them use government owned property 
not subject to taxation, while others, 
principally the railroads, do not have 
that opportunity •• ~. 
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Each agency of transportation 
should assume not only its fair share 
of the cost of providing and main-
taining the government owned facilities 
it uses but its fair share of the 
general cost of government as well ••• 
All the taxes paid by the railroads 
are devoted to general government pur-
poses such as the support of schools 
and courts, fire and police protection, 
and other general costs. A part is even 
used to coveF the costs of aid to air 
carriers .... 
••• the present situation in which 
one form of transportation is singled 
out for separate and preferred promo-
tional treatment remedied ••• * 
. 
Another student has pointed to the double 
role that railroads have had to play throughout their 
history in this country.** They are expected to operate 
just like any other enterprise, he says, and try to make 
a reasonable profit (which is dependent on general 
economic conditions and managerial efficiency). In 
other words, they are judged on results by economic or 
commercial criteria, like all other businesses. How-
ever, he continues, public policy has emphasized a 
variety of non-economic and social-political roles for 
the railroa~s. Some of th~se roles are specifically 
mentioned by the author. They include the Hoch-Smith 
* 30, F. 73 (Also 12, P. 345) 
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Resolution, passed in 1925, which would require the 
ICC to consider the conditions prevailing in any 
industry when adjusting freight rates. This would 
then mean that the railways would have to subsidize 
any depressed industry. Therefore, i:f any segment of 
the economy was in trouble, for instance agriculture, 
the railroads would have to come to their aid. (This 
resolution was later deemed unadvisable, but the im-
portant factor is that it was considered quite serious-
ly). In summation, the railroads at various times have 
been required or expected to act as u instruments o:f 
governmental policy to bolster a sagging economy or 
industry, to help balance the budget, to offset inflation, 
to effectuate antitrust policy, to stimulate competitors 
and provide service where it is not vi tally needed.u* 
So the railroads have been burdened w1 th a 
social obligation as well as subsidized competition. 
The question may be asked, 'Do not all businesses have 
certain social obligations that must be met?' The 
answer is yes, of course, but no other segment of the 
economy has been expected to perform such a great variety 
o:f social tasks and still have their efficiency measured 
by an strictly commercial yardstickn. *"'" What about the 
* 43 
....... 43 
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effect of subsidized competition? What does it consist 
of? Does it have any bearing on a discussion of rail-
road commuter problems? 
' THE RAilROADS COMPETITORS 
Besides the automobile, with it"'"s direct effect 
on commuter travel, the railroad has many strong com-
petitors. The airplane, the ship and the motor truck 
receive public aid in one way or another. The two most 
serious competitors are the motor truck and the airplane. 
MOTOR TRUCK COMPETITION 
Even the casual newspaper reader is familiar 
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with the many inequalities that exists in the competitive 
situation between the railroads and the trucking industry. 
It has been pointed out that the railroads own their right-
of-way and pay taxes on them, while the trucking industry• s 
right-of-way, i.e. the highways, are built with federal, 
state and municipal funds. While members of the trucking 
industry claim that they, too, pay taxes back to these 
governments, many of' the 1 taxes• that they quote are, in 
fact, user charges. A toll paid to enable one to use a 
road is not a tax but a charge made only for the use of' 
t.he road. A similar situation exists when a railroad 
leases part of its right-of-way to another carrier. The 
charge is not a tax, but a user charge. Therefore, high-
way expenditures made by the government may be regarded 
as a subsidy to the truckilllg··indust.ry. 
Trucking lines, being engaged only in the trans-
portation of freight, are not bothered with the necessity 
of' maintaining unprofitable passenger service, as are the 
railroads. Concentrated in the transportation of freight, 
the industry can enjoy the relatively higher returns on 
this segment of' the business. 
Highway transportation of freight of'f'ers many 
advantages, particularly for short hauls. The added tax 
burden carried by the railroads in addition to the large 
amounts of money needed to maintain their right-of-way, 
places the railroad in a serious competitive disadvantage 
as a result of public policy. 
AIRPLANE COMPETITION 
Airline competition is serious to the railroads, 
both in freight and passenger service. It was the de-
velopment of the airplane as a vehicle f'or the·mass move-
ment of peopl~ that caused a reduction in the number of 
people using trains for long distances. The airplane has 
grown w1 th government funds and subsidies. 
The regulation of the airlines in the United 
89 
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States has been unique in its objectives. One reature of 
the Act (Civil Aeronautics Act) is that it directs the 
Administration to encourage and foster the development of 
civil aeronautics and air commerce, both in the United 
States and abroad. In addition, Section 406 of the CAA 
has a feature that cannot be ~ound in any provision of the 
Interstate Commerce Act. It provides the Civil Aeronautics 
Bo-ard (CAB) with the authority to fix airmail rates, and it 
specifies that the rate of payment for the airmail should 
be in accordance with the need of each carrier, in order 
to maintain and continue the development of' air trans-
portation. In effect, it is a guarantee of' the continued 
solvency of a certified air carrier. The only limit to 
the rate of' payment is that it must be within the amount 
appropriated each year by Congress for the transportation 
of air mail. 
By far the largest amount of public aid for the 
airlines comes from the publicly built and publicly main-
tained airports throughout the nation. The airlines pay 
nothing for their right-of-way, i.e. the use of the federal 
airways, or for aids to navigation or signal and traffic 
controls. Continuous weatner observation service is pro-
vided without cost, and federal employ~es staff the control 
towers of the publicly supported .airports. Other indirect 
public aids include financial assistance the federal 
government provides to aircraft manufacturers for re-
search and development of new types of airplanes. 
In fact, according to a study made by the 
Railroad Committee for the Study of Transportation, 
the 
••• aggregate of these various 
financial aids to air transportation 
exceeds the value of land grants to 
railroads in their early days. They 
are greater than the cost of the 
Panama Ganal, or the expenditures 
for navigation on inland waterways. 
The value of the lands granted to 
the railroads to stimul~te their 
construction and open up undeveloped 
territories has been repaid tenfold 
. by reduced rates to the government 
on freight and personnel, and t.he 
operating expenses and carrying 
charges of the Panama Canal are 
financed from the tolls paid by the 
users •• ·* 
IMPORTANCE OF SUBSIDIES TO RAILROAD COMPETITORS 
It is difficult to find a justificat~on for 
pub].ic aid to "the trucking industry. There does not 
seem to be any valid reason for aiding truckers ~th 
public funds. On the other hand, t.he nation has a 
need for a complete transportation system. Integrated 
highways are essential for defense and for the growth 
of the econollijT. The nation cannot be dependent on just 
* 12, P. 356 
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one form of ~ransportation. A similar situation exists 
in the case of the airlines. The defense requirements 
of the country necessita~e an adequate supply of air-
planes for air transportation of men and goods. On the 
question of public aid, it is extremely doub~ful that 
the airlines could have reached their present stage of 
development and service without public funds. 
The need for an integrated system of trans-
portation in the United States is clear. It must be 
determined, however, whether or not it is right to aid 
some members of the transporta~ion industry at the ex-
pense of other members. Are the needs of ~he nation 
really met in this way? Are not the railroads as impor-
tant, both in peacetime and wartime? 
There is no question but that this subsidized 
compe~ition has seriously affected the earning power of 
the railroads, and this in turn has caused the squeeze 
on profits which makes it necessary for the railroads 
to discontinue unprofitable service ••• commuter service. 
The automobile, ~he immediate cause of the 
decline in the number of railroad commuter passengers, 
is very heavily subsidized by public funds. The roads 
and bridges used by the driver are built with public 
funds. Traffic controls and other safety devices, the 
policemen who direct the traffic, the engineers that plan 
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traffic flow pa-tterns - all these services are provided 
by public funds and must be considered a subsidy to the 
automobile owner. 
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Whatever action is taken to solve "the commuter 
crisis in Boston, it should be remembered that all of the 
railroads competitors are heavily subsidized by the public. 
-·-
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CHAPTER SIXTEEN 
TWO ALTERNATIVES 
OTHER ALTERNATIVES ELIMINATED 
Various proposals have been mentioned for 
solving the commuter problem. Certain of these can 
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be eliminated at this point. Others have possibilities, 
but would require more time than is now available to 
the State. A combination of action may be required. 
Government ownership of all segments of railroad trans-
portation would not solve the ~ediate problem, for it 
would require many years of negotiation and a change in the 
attitude of the general public. Of course, it could be 
a long range objective, in which case, the continued pay-
ment of a subsidy would assure continued operation of the 
commuter service. Relaxation of regulatory rules govern-
ing the railroads would not help, for the regulation is 
needed. Without it, continuation of railroad commuter 
service in the Boston area would not be possible. A 
consolidation of railroads in the New England area would 
not help the problem either. The same conditions and factors 
would plague a consolidated road as they do the existing 
corporate structures. In addition, a merger would consume 
time, and would not help the immediate situation. It has 
--
also been pointed out that such a merger might concentrate 
. . . 
too much power in the hands-of the railroad interests, 
too much power for the good of the public. 
There are only three alternatives left. The 
creation of an independent transit authority to purchase 
the existing right-0~-way of the Old Colony and operate 
a rapid transit line; the extention of the authority of 
the MTA to include purchase of' the Old Colony and. the 
operation of' rapid transit therein; and continued sUbsidy 
grants to the railroads by either the State or Federal 
governments. The only alternative compatible with 
future governmental ownership or a combination of the 
roads is the subsidy. The first two will result in local 
government ownership of the commuter branch of the rail-
road. 
A.TRAl~SIT AUTHORITY 
It is not clear just why the Old Colony Area 
Transportation Commission recommended the establishment 
of a separate transit authority to deal with the problem. · 
The report states that u ••• in the field of mass transit, 
the ultimate goal is a single integrated system of rapid 
transit lines and bus lines to serve the entire Metro-
politan Boston area.u* The Commissions' objection to 
* 48, P.7 
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extending the MTA apparent~y rests in the basis of financing 
that body, for the report states that 11 Unti~ an en-
tire~y new basis of financing is developed for the MTA, 
new rapid transit lines will have to be financed by in-
dependent transit districts in the west, the north and 
the south of the present transit district. 11 * It is 
further stated that if the MTA is put on a sound financial 
basis, then all of the separate districts should be merged 
into one district. (This is called 'passing the buck' to 
a future generation). The problem of cons-olidating a 
number of transit authorities will not be any easier in 
the future than beginning with an integrated system, if 
an integrated system is the community's goal. Certainly, 
the property owners in cities outside the present dis-
trict would not welcome any change that reduces the 65% 
deficit burden borne by Boston and increases or requires 
them to pay a share of the burden themselves. But is 
there any reason to believe that people will change with 
the passage of years? Wi~l taxpayers in those districts 
ever wish to assume part of the burden? Probably not. In 
addition, the whole success of the plan presented by the 
Commission is dependent on the cooperation of the MTA. 
The plan envisions full transfer privileges to the MTA 
* 48 P. 7 
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so that most of the riders of the proposed South Shore 
Transit Authority will be able to enjoy the facilities of 
the MTA without paying a penny toward it. • s deficit. A 
clear case of politics is readily seen. The Commission 
wants to establish the.rap1d transit, but it also wants 
the support of the riders of the Old Colony, support that 
might not be forthcom~g if suggestions were made that 
they help pay for the MTA deficits. Of course, this is 
aside from the main issue, for the relative advantages 
and disadvantages of rapid transit service are the same 
whether the service is provided by the MTA or by an in-
dependent authority. But the waste that will be in-
curred if the principle of independent authorities is 
accepted must be considered. The duplication of adm 
ministration, supply and other factors is obvious. And 
the principle is in direct opposition to every study that 
this writer has seen dealing with the transportation 
problem. 
Ohapter Ten dealt with the report of the Old 
Colony Area Transportation Commission. Certain observa-
tions were made about the estimates presented by the 
Commission. It was pointed out that no provisions were 
made for the coat of repair shops and that only $28,000 
was allocated for damage costs. It was also pointed out 
that the Commonwealth would have to design, build and 
97 
mainta~ all new underpasses and overpasses and existing 
underpasses and overpasses. This would be paid for with 
money from the general highway fund and would constitute 
a considerable subsidy payment by the state.to the 
transit line. The Old Colony must not only maintain 
and pay taxes on·it 1 s overpasses and underpasses, but 
must build new ones when the officials of a town feel that 
one is needed. 
An examination of Exhibit I reveals that the 
Authority Will have an initial capital outlay of at least 
$2o,ooo,ooo. The actual figure will probably be well 
~ excess of that amount. In addition, the estimated 
annual expense will be about $3,000,000. It is hoped 
that the line will enjoy an annual income of $4,3ss·,ooo. 
There is reason to believe, on the basis of the experience 
of the MTA, that the figure will not be anywhere near 
that amount. It is more probable that a deficit opera-
tion will exist. 
CONTINUATION OF A SUBSIDY PAYMENT 
The present subsidy payment to the Old Colony 
is $900,000 a year. There are indications that ~f a new 
agreement is made with the New Haven, the subsidy will be 
higher. 
It has been stated that certain advantages are 
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-gained by the City by the payment of' the subsidy. Refer-
ence was made to the fact that Boston receives over li 
million dollars a year in taxes :rrom the New Haven, three 
times the amount that the City had to pay toward the sub-
sidy. In addition, the continued use of South Station by 
the New Haven preserves the property values in the area 
around the structure. This in turn, preserves tax re-
venue for the City. 
Another advantage to the subsidy concept is 
the :ract that the huge initial outlay of' funds required 
for a rapid transit line would not have to be made. This 
in~tial investment might be good, however, for the long 
run. 
The subsidy payment leaves the operation of' the 
railroad in the hands of' the railroad. The community does 
not gain too much in improved service. True, the rail-
road cannot discontinue existing service, but it is 
very unlikely that any new service would be initiated. 
We are left, then, with a series of' advantages 
and disadvantages inherent in both the continuation of 
subsidy payments and in the establishment of rapid transit. 
A decision must be made by the General Court on one of' 
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these two alternatives. The concluding chapter cont'q.ins~;~.·: · . 
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this writers recommendation :ror action. 
-' 
OHAPTER SEVENTEEN 
A PROPOSAL FOR ACTION 
The railroad commuting problem is only part of 
the whole problem of transportation in the Greater Boston 
area, and the problem of transportation is, in turn, only 
a part of the whole problem of the proper economic de-
velopment o:f the City o:f Boston. 
It is evident that the railroads, particularly 
the New Haven, are losing money by providing commuter 
service. The losses incurred by commuter operations 
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are seriously a:f:fecting the earning positions of the rail-
roads. While the railroads do not enjoy subsidization 
(with the exception o:f the 1958 payment to the New Haven 
:for the Old Colony), their principle competitors, the 
automobile, the bus, the airplane and the truck, all enjoy 
a very high degree of subsidization and special treatment. 
Railroads cannot be written o:f:f as a passing phase o:f the 
transportation scene. Military experts have repeatedly 
testified as to the importance o:f railroads to the national 
defense, both :for the movement of men and the movement o:f 
materials. The railroads are also important in the peace-
time economy, especially for the movement ef bulk goods. 
Because o:f the geographical location o:f the 
New England region, the railroads play an important role in 
·z= m 
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its economy, particularly in the transportation of raw 
materials and food into the region. 
The railroads must be kept sol vent. Their 
subsidized competitors are making their operations in-
creasingly costly, and the added burden of maintaining 
the unprofitable service on commuter lines for the benefit 
of the community is further reducing their earning ca-
pacities. But, railroad commuter service in -Greater 
Boston, especially on the Old Colony, is needed. It is 
vital. A decision must be made on how to continue the 
service on the Old Colony, and that decision is· sure to 
influence the other railroads that serve the community 
with commuter operations. It is becoming increasingly 
clear that the cost of providing this service cannot 
properly be relegated to the railroads alone. 
The alternatives are clear. The State can ne-
gotiate with the railroad and, if needed, subsidy payments 
can be made. Or, as has been suggested with the Old 
Colony, the State can establish a new transit system to 
replace the railroad service. 
The establisbme~t of a new transit system (or 
the extension of the MTA) would be putting the cart be-
fore the horse. The central problem is the redevelopment 
of Boston. Transportation is only part of that program. 
Therefore, a comprehensive program of urban re·development 
must be initiated first. The groundwork for the esta~ 
blishment of an integrated Metropolitan community, with 
Boston at the core, must be laid immediately. Boston 
must be revitalized. While this program is taking place, 
subsidy payments, if needed, should be continued to the 
New Haven. In "this way, Boston will receive tax money 
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from the New Haven and the continued use of South Station 
will be assurred. The New Haven has the equipment and the 
ability to continue the aperation if the needed relief is 
granted. As an alternative, a program similar to Operat-ion 
Northwest might be tried. The results of that program. 
wi11 soon be available and "they should be at.udied closely. 
Perhaps some· of "the ideas might be applicable to "this area. 
When the program of redevelopment is near com-
pletion, the transportation situation should be reviewed. 
If it ~a felt that the railroad cannot do the job, then the 
MTA should be given the responsibility of composing a 
comprehensive rapid transit plan for the whole metropolita~ 
area. For after a. program. of redevelopment is completed, 
there might not be a need for any service on the Old Colony 
lines. But if there is, then the planning can take place 
with full knowledge of the needs of a. renewed city. 
Of course, it would be far easier for the General 
Court to create a new Authority or extend the MTA rather than 
to attack the real problem of Boston and its place in the 
I 
- -- . 
Metropolitan area. But only when this is accomplished 
can a comprehensive transportation plan be made. It 
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might be that rapid transit will be needed, that the rail-
roads will not have a place in the commuter business. Or, 
their role might become more important. The City must 
be replanned rirst, then the transportation system re-
viewed. For the present, a continuation or a reasonable 
subsidy, which will guarantee the continuation or service, 
is both rair and equitable. It is unneccessary to commit 
large runds or money now to ~lectriry the Old Colony or 
any other local railroad. Let the real problem be attack-
ed f'irst-: 
I 
I I 
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